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INTRODUCTION

A Comment to Professor John Quigley's article' on the role of
law in the permanent settlement in the Israeli - Palestinian conflict is a
difficult exercise. This is because it requires reference to almost each
and every legal aspect of the Arab - Israeli conflict, whereas the scope
of a Comment must, by nature, be limited. Nevertheless, Quigley's
article requires a response that illustrates the alternative, and currently
prevailing, point of view.
With this in mind, this Comment first illustrates that Quigley's
proposed approach to substitute the current process of negotiations
and agreements with politically imposed "international legal norms"
is unjustified and impracticable. In fact, Quigley suggests to turn the
academic or political application of legal norms to "facts" according
to one version of those facts by applying "international legal norms,"
according to one version of interpretation of those norms which he
advances.
However, this proposed process runs counter to the over twenty
year success of the current approach since the Camp David accords. In
fact, Quigley has already expressed the positions advanced in his
article in previous scholarship.2 These positions have already been
critiqued by other scholars.' Hence, and with all due respect to
Quigley, his proposed solution should be rejected by the international
legal community.4
I John Quigley, The Role of Law in a Palestinian- IsraeliAccommodation, 31 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'LL. 351 (1999).
2 See, e.g., John Quigley, The Oslo Accords: More than Israel Deserves, 12 AM. U.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 509 (1997); John Quigley, Loan Guarantees,Israeli Settlements and
the Middle East Peace, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 547 (1992).
3 See, e.g., Eugene Rostow, The Perils of Positivis: A Response to Quigley (1992) 2
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 229; Louis Beres, Response to John Quigley, 12 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 509 (1997); Louis Beres, The Oslo Agreements in InternationalLaw,
NaturalLaw, and World Politics, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 715 (1997).
4 The author wishes to emphasize his support for the approach presented by Prof.
Hiram E. Chodosh. See Hiram E. Chodosh, Reflection on Reform: An Introduction to the
Symposium - Legal Foundationsfor Peace and Prosperity in the Middle East, 31 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 427 (1999). The desire to see the implementation of reforms and
integration of civil society values in the emerging society in the Palestinian Authority is
fully justified. But the actors from outside must be patient and considerate. They should
be very careful to refrain from paternalism and from exercising imposition of specific
models or machineries. Each society has its own social climate and unique
circumstances. Models from other countries cannot be transplanted into a society as the
Palestinian community, as well without proper adjustments. This requires a proper
process of adjustment, including patience and time. This is even more the case within
emerging societies in their formative years. I therefore share Prof. Chodosh's approach
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Following this argument, this Comment will then demonstrate
that Quigley's proposed "international legal norms" are not the only
version of these norms.5 Indeed, there are strong positions expressed
in international legal scholarship which formulate legal norms quite
differently than does Quigley.6 Consequently, when these alternative
views are applied to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, they produce
different conclusions than those advanced by Quigley. Moreover, the
facts alleged by Quigley can be formulated in quite a different way
which also produces different conclusions, including the issues of
borders, settlements, refugees, and the status of Jerusalem.
II. NEGOTIATIONS AND AGREEMENTS HAVE PROVED MoRE SuccESsFuL
THAN LEGAL APPLICATION OF NORMS

Quigley rejects the negotiations and agreements approach that has
been successful in resolving conflict in the Middle East among the
parties to that conflict - the Arab States, the Palestinians and Israel.
These accomplishments include the 1979 peace treaty with Egypt, the
1994 peace treaty with Jordan, and the ongoing peace process with the
Palestinians under the Oslo framework. Instead, Quigley suggests
abandoning these negotiations and adopting an approach of politically
imposed legal resolution based upon "international legal norms" of his
construction.
Since 1948, the Arab-Israeli conflict has produced recurrent
armed conflicts and violence. Resolutions of the United Nations and
other international organizations utterly failed to produce satisfactory
solutions. After recurrent wars and too much blood shed, the Arab Israeli conflict began to be resolved by negotiations and agreements.
explicated in his article and commend his advice to all those who are involved in
Palestinian legal reform efforts.
5 In fact, Quigley has limited his resources to one school of thought with little or no
reference to the alternative views of, among others, Eugene Rostow, Julius Stone, Ruth
Lapidot Yehuda Blum, or Yoram Dinstein. See, e.g., Eugene Rostow, Peace as a Human
Right, 4 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 215 (1983); Julius Stone, Introduction to the
Peace Process Issue: The Peace Process: Legal Issues, 15 ISR. L.REv. 157 (1980); Ruth
Lapidot, The Strait of Tiran, the Gulf of Aqaba, and the 1979 Treaty of Peace betveen
Egypt and Israel, 77 AM J. INT'L L. 84 (1983); Yehuda Blum, From Camp David to
Oslo, 28 ISR. L.REv. 211 (1994); Yoram Dinstein, Arab-Israeli Conflict from the Aspect
of InternationalLaw, 43 U. N.B. L. J. 301 (1994). An attempt to use the works of these
and other scholars, and application of alternative arguments and positions, could have
qualified or perhaps changed the final results of Quigley's thesis, or at least would have
made his analysis more balanced.
6 See generally, e.g., Theodor Meiron, Applicability of Multilateral Conventions to
Occupied Territories, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 542 (1978); Yaacov Bar-Shimon, ISRAEL AND
THE PEACE PROCESS 1977-1982: IN SEARCH OF LEGITIMACY FOR PEACE 338 (1994).
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First, Israel and Egypt were able to develop the Camp David
framework in 1978 and the resultant 1979 Peace Treaty between Israel
and Egypt.7 In 1993, the Olso Declaration of Principles was agreed
upon between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization
(P.L.O.), followed by Gaza and Jericho Agreement in May 1994, the
1994 Israel - Jordan Peace Treaty,8 and the Washington Interim
Agreement of September 1995.'
All of these peaceful agreements were conducted and achieved
through negotiations, predominantly among the parties concerned and
with the important assistance of the United States. For example, U.S.
President Jimmy Carter was instrumental in the achievement of the
Camp David accords." ° President Bill Clinton was also very helpful in
supporting and promoting the Oslo Accords after these were
formulated in bilateral negotiations between Israel and the P.L.O The
United States, led by President Clinton, was also active in the Israel Jordan Peace Treaty by witnessing, signing and supporting that
agreement.
Not only did the United States support the peace process in its
formation, but it has provided ongoing political and financial support
to further buttress peace between Israel and Egypt, providing civil and
military assistance to Egypt generally equivalent to that provided to
Israel. In addition, the United States has given economic assistance to
Jordan, and organized donor conferences to support the Palestinian
Authority, which in the last four years has yielded over $2 billion
dollars.
These negotiation and agreements achievements fail to impress
Quigley. He does not approve of bilateral negotiations and agreements
that have produced the above listed host of achievements and binding
obligations for peace and prosperity. Quigley is also not satisfied
with the role of the United States in the peace process. He suggests
substituting the negotiations and agreements approach with
ambiguous, undefined "international legal norms" imposed by
7 Ding and Koening, Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel: Demarcation of
Internationally Recognized Boundaries, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 590 (1989); Camp David
Agreements, Sept. 17, 1978, Egypt-Isr.-U.S., 17 I.L.M. 1466 (1978).
8 David Relsner, Peace of the Jordan, 4 JUST. 3 (1995); The Peace Treaty with

Jordan (1995); Treaty of Peace between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom
of Jordan of October 26 (1994).
9 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements of September
13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1525; Agreements on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area of May 4,
1994, 33 I.L.M. 622; Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Power and Responsibilities
of August 29, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 941.
10 Michla Pomerance, U.S. Involvement in Sinai: 1975 as a Legal-Political Turning
Point, 20 ISR. L. REv. 299 (1985).
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outsiders on Palestinian - Israeli relations to formulate the permanent
settlement between Israel and the Palestinians.
In spite of problems that invariably arise in international
negotiations, the process has produced results. The fact of the matter

is that it was this approach that made it possible for Israel to establish
peace with Egypt. It was this approach that is to be credited with the
Peace Treaty between Jordan and Israel as well as the significant
peace achievements to date with the Palestinians.
Given the success of the current negotiations and agreements
approach, Quigley's alternative approach should not be accepted. It is
unwise to reject a successful model that has proved in reality that it
can bring peaceful achievements and instead adopt a model that has
not been successful in the past - neither in the region nor elsewhere.
Nor is it wise to reject the positive role of United States engagement
in the process, substituting instead untested parties from the United
Nations and Europe. One should not change or replace a winning
combination with a doubtful and untested process.
Principles of international law serve as bargaining tools in the
hands of the parties to multilateral or bilateral negotiations for
resolving disputes. They are most important as a general platform of
the negotiation. In a way, the principles of international law perform
the same function as the law does in domestic law negotiations,
sometime called the "shadow of the law."'" This is, of course, only by
general analogy, and is not totally identical to the legal and actual
circumstances in international legal situations. However, and again
with all due respect to Quigley, to turn the law and the legal approach
into the sole machinery of international relations or the sole
machinery for resolution of international conflicts is wrongheaded and
should not be accepted to replace the current approach of negotiations
and agreements.
Moreover, the general consensus within the international legal
community today is to prefer alternative dispute resolution models to
adjudication in resolving disputes.12 This wisdom should also be true
in resolving disputes in the international level. The parties to the Oslo
Accords agreed expressly on negotiation in order to formulate the
permanent Israeli-Palestinian settlement. 3 The general position of the
parties will result in a much better process for arriving at an open
resolution of the issues among the parties. Any imposed solution will
be rejected by the party dissatisfied with the proposed solution.
"1 Cf. SHIMON SHETREET, JUSTICE IN ISRAEL

462 (1994).

12 Smadar Ottolengi, Alternative Dispute Resolution, ISR. L. Y.B. 1992-1993, 535

(1994); Arie Vinshell The Taba Affair: Issues in Compromising and Arbitration (1985)
24(45) INT'LDISP: SOC'Y & ST. 32 (1985).
'3 The Declaration of Principles, arts. IV, V, 32 I.L.M. 1525 (1993).
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Additionally, negotiations and agreements are already an
"international legal norm" because negotiations and agreements are
mandated by the international community through the Oslo Accords
and United Nations Security Council resolutions, thereby further
undermining Quigley's thesis. For example, UN Security Council
Resolution 338 expressly confirms the principle of negotiations.
Security Council Resolution 242 also strongly implies negotiations by
establishing a set of principles that should be applied in the process of
the "establishment of peace in the Middle East."14 In view of these
acts of the Security Council, this application should be done in the
process of negotiation between the parties, not through adjudication of
assumed legal norms. Indeed, even when legal application was
"emP.L.O.yed" to resolve disputes, such as in the Taba arbitration
between Israel and Egypt, this was done by virtue of a previously
negotiated agreement between the parties. 5 Moreover, the process of
arbitration was agreed upon in the Taba case by the parties on a
limited and carefully defined issue in keeping with the overall
framework of relations between Israel and Egypt. It was shaped by
the parties to the dispute and not left for a post hoc theoretical
application of "legal norms" to an assumed set of "facts," as Quigley
would apply to Israeli-Palestinian relations.
II. THE ALTERNATIVE POSITION ON LEGAL NORMS AND FACTS IN THE
ISRAELI - PALESTINIAN SITUATION

Quigley examines the issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
and presents a legal analysis that appears greatly influenced by the
Palestinian position. 6 However, for the reasons that follow, the
Quigley approach should further be rejected in view of the alternative
legal scholarship which supports key aspects of the Israeli position,
further undercutting Quigley's purported "international legal norms."

14 Eugene Rostow, The Drafting of Security Council Resolutions 242: The Role of the

Non-RegionalActors, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. 489 (1993).
15 Yoram Dinstein, The Taba ArbitrationAward, 14 TEL-AVIV U. L. REV. 57 (1989);
Yoram Dinstein, Arab-Israeli Conflict from the Aspect of InternationalLaw, 43 U. N.B.
L. J. 301 (1994).
16 The author notes that, in his view, Quigley tends to propose very absolute
statements. For example, Quigley states that the "P.L.O. takes a position that is
consistent with international legal norms, whereas Israel takes a position inconsistent
with those norms." See Quigley, supra notel, at 381. This absolute assertion is offered
without any qualification, or reservations.
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A. UN General Assembly Resolutions, As Well As Unpassed Security
Council Resolutions,Are Not Binding InternationalLaw
Quigley proposes a model of legal resolution that purports to
apply "law" to "facts." In order to be in conformity with this model,
Quigley must apply to those facts only norms that can be defined in
international law as "binding law." It is well-settled that adopted
United Nations General Assembly resolutions are considered merely
"recommendations" and, at best, may be persuasive of what
international law "should be." However, they are not an expression of
current and binding international law. Thus, it is very questionable
whether Quigley is doctrinally consistent in proposing "a legal
resolution" of the Israeli - Palestinian conflict by relying on General
Assembly resolutions which are not binding international law.
Likewise, it is well-settled that a proposed UN Security Council
resolution that fails to pass in the Security Council because one of the
five Permanent Members has exercised its veto power, is, as a draft
resolution, of no legal consequence whatsoever. Hence, Quigley's
reliance upon vetoed Security Council resolutions ignores that fact
that such drafts have no international legal force. Thus, with all due
respect, Quigley's use of vetoed Security Council resolutions is also
inconsistent with the thesis he advances.
B. The Principles of Peace Contained in Security Council
Resolution 242
In the Oslo Accords, the parties agreed that the issue of borders
should be negotiated in the permanent settlement. 7 Quigley advances
the proposition that legal resolution requires total Israeli withdrawal
and not territorial compromise. He disregards the well established and
widely supported interpretation that the language and the history of
UN Security Council Resolution 242 in 1967 does not support his
position for total Israeli withdrawal and instead favors territorial
compromise and partial withdrawal. Moreover, he fails to give
sufficient weight to the fact that Resolution 242 refers to "secure and
recognized boundaries" and refer to withdrawal from "territories," not
from "the territories," or from "all the territories."
Likewise, Quigley fails to give due regard to the alternative
position that the legal status of the West Bank relies upon the fact that
it was seized by Israel in self defense, and that Jordan was not
recognized by the international community as the de jure sovereign of
the West Bank since it seized the area in 1948 during in an arguable
war of aggression against the State of Israel. The same arguments and
reservations are applicable with regard to the settlements. Quigley
17

See Declaration of Principles, supranote 9.
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disregards the alternative position which justifies the establishment of
settlements provided that they are established on public land and not
private land. This has been Israeli policy since 1979 when the Israeli
Supreme Court adjudicated the Elon Moreh case. 8
Quigley points out that the Oslo Declaration of Principles, which
recalls the language of Resolution 242, calls on Israel to withdraw
from occupied territories. The controversy is over the interpretation of
the term: "from territories" or "from the territories." According to
Quigley, the Palestinian interpretation of the term is more consistent
with history, as evident by the French text, which speaks of
withdrawal "from the territories."
Further, Quigley suggests that occupation of territories does not
give rights of any kind, according to international law, even if
Resolution 242 had not been passed. Therefore, argues Quigley, Israel
should withdraw from all the territories for they are occupied. This
position is not accepted by Israel nor by some scholars, who hold that
Resolution 242 provides for a just and lasting peace through an
international agreement to be reached by negotiations. 9
According to this alternative position, the presently existing
settlements should be held legitimate, as Resolution 242 recognizes
security as a central and vital element of the permanent IsraeliPalestinian settlement. Resolution 242 does not contain an operative
instruction except to set up a special representation for promoting the
agreement and reporting to the UN Security Council. Resolution 242
views negotiation as vital for maintaining peace, and sets down a set
of principles for achieving peace. The principles of Resolution 242
include a just and lasting peace, withdrawal from territories,
termination of belligerency, and peace within secure and recognized
boundaries. Resolution 242 also refers to the free navigation through
the international sea paths closed by the Arab countries during the
1967 war against Israel.
Resolution 242 does not call for full withdrawal to 1967 borders,
as Quigley suggests is mandated under "international legal norms."
nor to the 1967 armistice lines. The intention was to change the
existing situation, not to revert to an old one. There were no
recognized borders between Israel and Arab countries, except the
'8 H.C. 390/79, Dwikat v. State of Israel, 34 (1) P.D. 1 (invalidating the military
authorities' seizure of plaintiffs' lands).

See also Shimon Shetreet, International

Protection of Human Rights in Israeli Law, in ISRAELI REPORTS TO THE XII
INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 307 (S. Goldstein ed., 1986); M.
NEGBI, JUSTICE UNDER OCCUPATION: THE ISRAELI SUPREME COURT VERSUS THE MILITARY
ADMINISTRATION INOCCUPIED TERRITORIES (1981)).
19 See, e.g., Eugene Rostow, The Drafting of Security Council Resolutions 242: The
Role of the Non-RegionalActors (1993) 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. 489 (1993).
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armistice lines. Thus, the intention was to have negotiation in order to
determine the boundaries according to security arrangements. The fact
that the preface to the Resolution emphasizes rejection of acquiring
territories by force is of no meaningful consequence, for Israel's
intention was to reach a settlement over the territories through mutual
consent. Also, concerning the refugee problem, Resolution 242 calls
for a just settlement. It is to be noted that the details will be left for
Peace through negotiation principle is
subsequent negotiation.
repeated also in Security Council Resolution 338, which expressly
states the principle of negotiation between the parties.2"
C. Settlements and the Status of Jerusalem
In reference to the civilian settlements set up by Israel, Quigley
quotes Prime Minister Netanyahu that all settlements will be
maintained. Quigley notes that this does not conform with
international law. Quigley notes that the P.L.O. accepts the 1993
Principles Declaration that Israel would control the settlements areas
during the interim period, in spite of the fact that from 1991 to 1992,
during the negotiations, the Palestinians representatives asked for an
end to the application of Israeli law to the settlements.
Quigley expresses the opinion that the P.L.O. position - to
remove settlers - conforms with international norms which hold that
an occupying power cannot change the sovereignty of the land so
occupied. Quigley refers to the 1907 Hague Regulations and to the
Geneva Convention of 1949, which according to prevailing views
permit the occupying power to act in order to maintain a civil way of
life, knowing and anticipating that it will withdraw in the future. In
addition, according to Article 49 in the Geneva Convention, it is
forbidden to transfer civilians to the occupied territory. Quigley also
mentions that the UN condemned the settlements for violating Article
49. The UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council resolved
that the settlements in the Occupied Territories of 1967 constituted
violation of the Geneva Convention and thus Quigley believes that
they are an obstacle to peace.
Quigley's position is misplaced because he misapprehends the
history of Article 49. The Geneva Convention was signed four years
after the end of the Second World War and in light of Nazi genocide
during the Holocaust. These factors strongly indicate that the
intention of Article 49 was to prevent what had been experienced in
two world wars - expulsion and settlement. According to rules of
interpreting laws that were legislated in different times, there is an
essential need to check the circumstances at that time. Thus, it is
20

See supranote 16.
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clear that the establishment of Israeli settlements do not involve the
element of expulsion of civilian population. All settlements have been
established on unpopulatedlands.

There is also a division of opinion as to whether Israel is to be
defined as an "occupying power" and whether the West Bank and
Gaza are "occupied territories." The alternative position that Quigley
fails to address is that Israel is not an occupying power in Gaza and
the West Bank, but rather an "administering power," and the
territories are therefore "administered territories." Therefore,
according to this view, Gaza and the West Bank are not occupied
territories, making Quigley's analysis improper.
"Occupying power" and "occupied territory" are defined terms in
international law. They refer to a situation in which, as a consequence
of hostilities between two states, one of them takes control of a
territory within the sovereignty of the other state. This territory is
defined as the "occupied territory" and the state in control as the
"occupying power." The sovereignty is not transferable. Instead, this
legal distinction is designed to protect the sovereign from the
occupation.
In view of this situation, and in stark contrast to the Quigley
position, a number of international scholars hold that, as it concerns
the West Bank, the Geneva Convention does not apply. In order to
clarify this situation, the proponents of this alternative view
emphasize that Israel seized the lands in self-defense.2 The invading
countries, with arguable aggression, could not gain sovereign rights in
the occupied territory. This should be viewed as a severe violation of
international law. Jordan's one-sided annexation of the West Bank in
1948 lacked a legal basis in international law and is contrary to the
armistice agreement between Israel and Jordan 1949. Its purpose was,
among others, to freeze the legal situation that is conditioned on a
peace agreement between the two sides.
In addition, the 1948 Jordanian annexation did not gain
international recognition, not even by Arab countries. Additionally,
Israel did not view itself as an occupying power in mandatory
Palestine territories beyond the boundaries of the UN partition plan of
1947. Jordan argued before the Security Council that the purpose of
the annexation was to keep the territories as a trustee, until a
settlement could be reached. In 1967, when the Israeli Defence
Forces (IDF) drove the Jordanian forces from the West Bank, it
ejected the Jordanian forces at a time when Jordan did not enjoy
sovereign legitimacy in the West Bank. Thus, per the alternative
view, the Geneva Convention provisions never applied to Jordan's
21 Amos Shapira, The Six Day War and the Right of Self Defense, 6 ISR. L. REV. 80

(1971).
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presence in the West Bank, and Israel is consequently not bound by it
either.
Similar arguments on the position regarding settlements are also
applicable to the legal resolution of the issue of Jerusalem. The legal
status of Jerusalem can be presented and analyzed quite differently
from the way it is presented by Quigley. According to this alternative
approach, the argument of self-defense is fully supported by law and
facts on the issue of Jerusalem as well. In the words of Professor
Shapira,22 "[e]ven if the United Nations record on this matter falls
short of establishing an affirmative finding decisively upholding the
lawfulness of Israel's action, at the very least it provides solid support
for Israel's claim to have acted in legitimate exercise of its right of
Self Defense."'
D. Refugees and DisplacedPersons

Quigley argues that on the issue of displaced persons, the law
However, Quigley falls to
supports the Palestinian position.
distinguish between two categories of persons. One is the "refugees"
of 1948, and the other, the "displaced persons" of 1967. This
distinction is well-established in the Oslo Accords, which very clearly
distinguish between refugees and displaced persons. The Oslo
Declaration of Principles in Article V(3) refers to "refugees," while in
Article XII it deals with "displaced persons." The Declaration of
Principles provides that the issue of refugees shall be dealt with in the
framework of the negotiations on the permanent settlement. As for the
issue of displaced persons, the Oslo Accords provide for a committee
of the parties to determine the modalities and conditions of allowing
displaced persons to go back to the Palestinian Areas.
Quigley expresses his opinion that the displaced persons, as a
consequence of an armed conflict, have a right to return, except when
they adopt a new citizenship. Quigley cites UN General Assembly
Resolution 194 (1948) concerning the Right of Return. Quigley
points out that Israel rejected this recommendation, even though it is
based upon international law that requires the original state or the
occupying power to let the displaced persons return. Quigley also
cites the Council of Europe resolution of avoiding discrimination on
national background and the international law position.

22

See Shapira, supranote 21, at 80.

23 Cf Y. Blum, THE JURIDICAL STATUS OF JERUSALEM (Feb. 1974); M. Schwabell,
What Weight to Conquest? 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 346-347 (1970). For an alternative view,
see Gerson, Trustee Occupant: The Legal Status of Israel's Presence in the West Bank,
14 HARV. INT'L L. J. 1 (1973).
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Quigley rejects outright Israel's position concerning the
economic situation and space. This argument, in his opinion, lacks
legal and actual basis when at the same time, Israel continues to
accept immigrants and encourages immigration. Quigley concludes
that Israel's position does not conform to international commitments,
referring to the right of return of the displaced persons.
There is a strong alternative position on the question of the
application of the right of return to the Israeli - Palestinian issue. The
right of return is the least developed of all the so-called "rights to
travel." In spite of the fact that it has gained recognition in most
countries, there is a controversy over its contents and over its
limitations. Some treaties give this right to citizens only. 4 Also, these
conventions generally refer to individuals, not to masses of displaced
persons or refugees. Moreover, there is disagreement whether the
right is applicable in times of emergency.
In view of the above, the relevant rules in international law give
right of return to the Palestinian Arab displaced persons. This is
highlighted by the fact that they lack relations with Israel, and as a
result of the existing emergency state. Likewise, it is inapplicable in
relation to masses of displaced persons as a consequence of political
conflicts, not as a result of international expulsion. As regards the
different UN resolutions cited by Quigley, previous resolutions do not
speak of an unconditioned right of return, and later resolutions - in
spite of the intention to secure this right - attach it to the right of selfdetermination. Those resolutions emphasize the political aspect of the
problem, not its human rights elements. '
E. Judicial Protection of Individual Rights in the Administered
Territories

Finally, the Supreme Court of Israel exercised judicial review in
the administered territories and applied international legal norms in its
review of the actions of the military government.26 The legality of the
activity of the military government has been tested in light of three
24 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Protocol No. 4, art. 2, 213 U.N.T.S. 222; American Convention
on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 22, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, at 1, O.A.S. Off.
Rec. OEA/Ser. L/V/II.23 doc. Rev. 2.
25 Ruth Lapidot, The Right of Return in InternationalLaw, with Special Reference to
PalestinianRefugees, 16 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 103 (1986).
26 See Meir. Shagmar, Legal Concepts and problems
of the Israeli Military
Government - The Inititial Stage, in MILITARY GOVERNMNET IN THE TERITORIES
ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL 1976-1980 (Meir. Shagmar ed., 1980); see also Shetreet, supra
note 23. See generally Negbi, supra note 18.
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sets of legal norms: the local law of the administered territories,
international law, and Israeli administrative law.
Local law in the administered territories is multifaceted,
comprising Ottoman law, British mandate regulations, Jordanian law
and military orders. The legality of acts of the military government in
the territories may be judged by its compliance to the local law as
amended by legislation of the military government.
With regard to international law, in a series of cases the Court has
accepted without question the applicability of the Hague Regulations
on military government.27 These apply since they are customary
international law that forms automatically an integral part of Israeli
domestic law.28 The Attorney General of Israel in 1967, Mr. Meir
Shamgar, willingly accepted the applicability of international law to
military government activities.
Case law supports that the Israeli military commander in the
administered territories is also subject to Israeli administrative law,
and the Supreme Court accordingly has reviewed his activities in light
of the principles of administrative law, particularly in matters
involving human rights.
The scope and nature of review of administrative acts of the
military government in the territories is generally the same as that
employed with regard to the government of the state of Israel.2 9 It is an
established principle of Israeli administrative law that the Court does
not substitute its judgment for that of the government agency. Nor
does the Court interfere in discretionary questions of whether
conditions exist necessitating the exercise of power. The Court does,
however, ascertain whether the officers acted in good faith and solely
for the purposes for which the authority was conferred. Other grounds
for review are, for example, the reasonableness of the action,3" breach
of procedural rights, excess of jurisdiction and discrimination.
27

Cr. A. 1/48, Sylvester v. Attorney General, 1 P.D. 5, (discussing applicability of

Hague Regulations, in first criminal appeal in state's history); H.C. 390/79, Dwikat v.
State of Israel, 34 (1) P.D. 1 at 8.
28 Of note, the status of the Geneva Convention is to be distinguished because it
forms a part of international law made by treaty. Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 287.
29 H.C. 274/82, Hamarah v. Minister of Defense, 36(2) P.D. 755, 756; see also H.C.
572/82 Muslah v. Minister of Defense, 36(4) P.D. 610, 612 (citing to Hamara).
30 In H.C. 361/82 Hamri v. Area Commander of Judea and Samaria, 36(3) P.D. 439,
441, Justice Barak held that a decision will not be reviewed by the Court as long as the
Court is satisfied that a reasonable man would have considered the existing evidence
sufficient so as to constitute the offense. "Unlawful on its face" would be a
Commander's decision that does not pass this test. See id.
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As most cases involve state security one may observe a certain
measure of restraint in the exercise of judicial review. This may be
illustrated by a number of cases in which the Supreme Court refused
to invalidate the military commanders' decisions.3 ' In Sachawil v.
Area Commander, for example, the Court rejected the applicant's
claim that he was being singled out for punishment.32 In the Shahin
case, the Court deferred to the government's decision to deport the
appellant, assuming that the authorities would find the right balance
between security considerations and the personal safety of the
deportee.33 The Court assumed that the commander would find the
right balance between security considerations and the personal safety
of the deportee.
It can be concluded that in this complicated situation, the state of
human rights in the administrated territories has been reasonable
under the circumstances. The supervisory function performed by the
Israeli Supreme Court has ensured respect for the rule of law as laid
down by local law, international law, and Israeli administrative law.
The mere existence of such a supervisory court has allowed the
residents a means of redress, and has safeguarded the principles that
exist throughout the Israeli legal system.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In view of the foregoing analysis, the Quigley approach should
not take the place of the current process of negotiations and
agreements. The current approach, probably now accepted by the
majority of the international legal community, has produced tangible
achievements of peace since the time of the Camp David accords.
Moreover, there are alternative visions of "international legal norms"
which, given the facts of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, can result in
different conclusions than Quigley proposes. Accordingly, the current
negotiation and agreement approach must be retained and
strengthened as a vital part of the legal foundation for peace and
prosperity in the Middle East in the next century.

31 See e.g. Baransi v. Minister of Interior, 37(3) P.D. 722, 723; Hamarah, 36(2) P.D.

755 at 756.
32 H.C. 434/79, Sachawil v. Area Commander, 34(1) P.D. 464, 465.
3' H.C. 95/85, Shahin v. Minister of Interior, 39(1) P.D. 798. Such conditions include
deportation to a country ready to grant him or her, among other things, permanent
resident status. Id at 798-99.

